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Paradoxes and Mechanisms for Choice under Risk 
By James C. Cox, Vjollca Sadiraj, and Ulrich Schmidt
1
 
 
Abstract: Experiments on choice under risk typically involve multiple decisions by 
individual subjects. The choice of mechanism for selecting decision(s) for payoff is an 
essential design feature unless subjects isolate each one of the multiple decisions. We review 
theoretical properties of mechanisms including properties of two new mechanisms introduced 
herein. We report an experiment with several payoff mechanisms that generate data that show 
systematic differences across mechanisms in subjects’ revealed risk preferences. We illustrate 
the importance of these mechanism effects by identifying their implications for tests of classic 
properties of theories of decision under risk. We also identify behavioral properties of 
mechanisms that diverge from theoretical incentive compatibility and may introduce bias in 
risk preference elicitation. 
 
Keywords: experiments, risky choice, payoff mechanisms, paradoxes 
JEL classifications: C91, D81 
 
1. Introduction  
Most experiments on choice under risk involve multiple decisions by individual subjects. This 
necessitates choice of mechanism for determining incentive payments to the subjects. 
Mechanisms used in papers published by top five general readership journals and a prominent 
field journal vary quite widely from “paying all decisions sequentially” to “paying all 
decisions at the end” to “randomly paying one decision for each subject” to “randomly paying 
a few decisions for each subject” to “randomly paying some of the subjects” to “randomly 
paying one of the subjects” to “fixed payment” to unidentified mechanisms.2  This suggests 
questions about whether different payoff mechanisms can elicit different data in otherwise 
                                                          
1
 Financial support was provided by the National Science Foundation (grant number SES-0849590) 
and the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung.  Glenn W. Harrison provided helpful comments and suggestions. 
2
 Table 1 in Azrieli, et al. (2012) reports a survey of some of the payoff mechanisms used in papers 
published in 2011 in American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, 
Review of Economic Studies, Quarterly Journal of Economics, and Experimental Economics.  The 
present authors’ survey of payoff mechanisms used in recent articles in Review of Economic Studies 
identified use of “pay all sequentially” (Goeree, et al., 2007; Oprea, et al., 2009; Potters and Suetens, 
2009; Battaglini, et al., 2010; and Sutter, et al., 2010) and “pay one randomly” (Costa-Gomes and 
Weizsäcker, 2008; Heinemann, et al., 2009; Offerman, et al., 2009;  and Deck and Schlesinger, 2010) 
and “pay all at the end” (Offerman, et al., 2009). 
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identical experimental treatments and, if so, whether these mechanism effects have significant 
implications for conclusions drawn from data. We report an experiment with several different 
payoff mechanisms that directly addresses these questions. Data from our experiment show 
that subjects’ revealed risk preferences differ across mechanisms. We illustrate the importance 
of these payoff mechanism effects by using data from alternative mechanisms to test for 
consistency with classic properties of theories of decision under risk. 
We provide an explanation of theoretical incentive compatibility or incompatibility of 
alternative mechanisms for decision theories with functionals that are linear in probabilities or 
linear in payoffs or linear in neither. Data from our experiment are used to identify 
mechanism biases in risk preference elicitation such as choice-order effects, previous-outcome 
effects, and other types of cross-task contamination.   
 
2.  Do Payoff Mechanisms Affect Revealed Risk Preferences? 
Our experimental treatments include payoff mechanisms commonly used for multiple 
decision experiments and two new mechanisms, introduced herein, that are theoretically 
incentive compatible for functionals that are linear in payoffs such as the dual theory of 
expected utility (Yaari, 1987) and linear cumulative prospect theory (Schmidt and Zank, 
2009). We also use another “mechanism” in which each subject makes only one decision. All 
treatments use the same five pairs of lotteries reported below. 
2.1  Lottery Pairs 
 
Our experiment includes the five pairs of lotteries reported in Table 1. Payoff in any 
lottery is determined by drawing a ball in the presence of the subjects from a bingo cage 
containing 20 balls numbered 1, 2, …, 20. Each lottery pair consists of a relatively safe and a 
relatively risky lottery. 
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Table 1.Lottery Pairs 
Pair Safe Risky  
1 Balls 1-15 Balls 16-20 Balls 1-16 Balls 17-20  
 $0 $3 $0 $5  
2 Balls 1-20  Balls 1-4 Balls 5-20  
 $6  $0 $10  
3 Balls 1-15 Balls 16-20 Balls 1-16 Balls 17-20  
 $0 $6 $0 $10  
4 Balls 1-5 Balls 6-20 Ball 1 Balls 2-5 Balls 6-20 
 $6 $12 $0 $10 $12 
5 Balls 1-20  Balls 1-4 Balls 5-20  
 $18  $12 $22  
 
Lotteries were not shown to participants in the format of Table 1. They were presented 
in a format illustrated by the example in Figure 1 which shows one of the two ways in which 
the lotteries of Pair 4 were presented to subjects in the experiment. Some subjects would see 
the Pair 4 lotteries as shown in Figure 1 while others would see them (randomly) presented 
with inverted top and bottom positioning and reversed A and B labeling. (See below for full 
details on randomized presentation of option pairs.) 
 
Ball nr 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Option A 
 
$6 
        
$12 
       Option B $0 
  
$10 
     
$12 
        
Figure 1. An Example of Presentation of Lotteries 
 
2.2  Alternative Payoff Mechanisms 
We experiment with the properties of several mechanisms defined below.  In one case 
we experiment with two alternative ways of implementing a mechanism that are both 
prominent in the literature.  
The payoff mechanism that appears to be most commonly used is the one in which 
each decision is paid sequentially before the following decision is made; we label this 
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mechanism “pay all sequentially” (PAS).3  Another way in which all decisions are paid is to 
pay all decisions at the end of the experiment with independent draws of random variables; we 
label this mechanism “pay all independently” (PAI).4 Another mechanism is to randomly 
select one decision for payoff at the end of the experiment. There are two ways in which this 
payoff mechanism is commonly used, which differ in whether a subject is shown all lotteries 
before making any choices. In the version of the mechanism used by Holt and Laury (2002) 
and Starmer and Sugden (1991), a subject is shown all lotteries in advance before any choices 
are made; we label this version of the mechanism “pay one randomly with prior information” 
(PORpi).  In an alternative version of this mechanism used by Hey and Orme (1994), a subject 
is shown each lottery pair for the first time just before a choice is made; we call this version of 
the mechanism “pay one randomly with no prior information” (PORnp). To our best 
knowledge, a new mechanism is to pay all decisions at the end of the experiment with one 
realization of a random variable; the theoretical properties of this mechanism are explained in 
section 3 (for comonotonic lotteries). There are two versions of this mechanism that differ in 
scale of payoffs. In one version, full payoff for all chosen lotteries is made according to one 
random draw at the end of the experiment; we label this mechanism “pay all correlated” 
(PAC).  With N decisions, the scale of the payoffs with PAC are the same as with PAS and 
PAI but they are N times the expected payoff with either version of POR.  The alternative 
version, called PAC/N, pays 1/N of the payoffs for all chosen lotteries; this version of the 
mechanism has the same scale of payoffs as both versions of POR.  
When reviewing the experimental evidence on violations of expected utility, Cubitt, et 
al. (2001) advocate the use of between-subjects designs, in which each subject makes one 
choice, rather than within-subjects designs with multiple decisions. We implement this 
approach and compare the resulting data to the data elicited by several multiple decision 
protocols using the above payoff mechanisms.  We subsequently refer to the single decision 
per subject protocol as the “one task” (OT) mechanism.   
2.3 Protocol 
 
The experiment was run in the laboratory of the Experimental Economics Center at Georgia 
State University. Subject instructions are contained in appendix 2. Subjects in groups OTi, i = 
1, 2, …, 5, just had to perform one binary choice between the lotteries of Pair i which was 
played out for real. Subjects in an OTi treatment were first shown a lottery pair at the time 
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which the chosen mechanism was reported for 2011 publications.  
4
 This mechanism was used in Burks, et al. (2003) and Chaudhuri and Gangadharan (2007). 
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they made their decision. In treatment PORnp subjects were first shown a lottery pair at the 
time they made their decision for that pair. In all other multiple decision treatments, including 
PORpi, subjects were shown all five lottery pairs at the beginning of a session, as follows. 
Each subject was given an envelope with five (independently) randomly-ordered small sheets 
of paper.  Each of the five small sheets of paper presented one lottery pair in the format 
illustrated by Figure 1. Each subject could display his or her five sheets of paper in any way 
desired on his or her private decision table. 
Subjects entered their decisions in computers. In all treatments, including OT, the top 
or bottom positioning of the two lotteries in any pair and their labeling as Option A or Option 
B were (independently) randomly selected by the decision software for each individual 
subject. In all treatments other than OT, the five lottery pairs were presented to individual 
subjects by the decision software in independently-drawn random orders. Each decision 
screen contained only a single pair of lotteries.   
Subjects in treatments PORpi and PORnp had to make choices for all five lottery pairs 
and at the end one pair was randomly selected (by drawing a ball from a bingo cage) and the 
chosen lottery in that pair was played out for real (by drawing a ball from another bingo cage).  
In treatments PAI, PAC, PAC/N, and PAS subjects had to make choices for all five pairs but 
here the choice from each pair was played out for real by drawing a ball from a bingo cage. In 
treatment PAI the five choices were played out independently at the end of the experiment 
whereas in treatments PAC and PAC/N the five choices were played out correlated at the end 
of the experiment (i.e. one ball was drawn from the bingo cage which determined the payoff 
of all five choices). In treatment PAS the chosen lotteries were played immediately after each 
choice was made (by drawing a ball from a bingo cage after each decision). In all treatments 
subjects were permitted to inspect the bingo cage and the balls before making their decisions. 
Each ball drawn from a bingo cage was done in the presence of the subjects (and put back in 
the cage in the presence of the subjects).   
 
2.4 Revealed Risk Preferences 
 
 The main question we are concerned with is whether the risk preferences revealed by 
subjects differ systematically across treatments that use different payoff mechanisms. The five 
columns of Table 2 present, for each lottery choice pair i (=1,2,…,5) and each elicitation 
mechanism, the percentage of subjects who chose the less risky (or “safe”) lottery in that pair, 
denoted by Si.  
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There are big differences across mechanisms in the percentages of Si choices. Looking 
down the Si columns of Table 2 we see that in three out of five columns the largest figure is 
more than three times the smallest one: for pair 2, choices of the safer option vary over 
mechanisms from 15.52% (OT) to 52.63% (PAC and PAI) or 50.00% (PORpi); for pair 4 
these figures vary from 10.26% (PAS) to 34.21% (PAI) or 32.50% (PORnp); and for pair 5, 
choices of the safer option vary from 17.95% (PAS) to 60% (PORnp). The Kruskal-Wallis 
rank test rejects at 10% significance level (p-value is 0.089) the null hypothesis that these 
frequencies come from the same population.  
 
Table 2.  Observed Frequencies (in %) of the Less Risky Option Across Pairs 
(low and high column figures in bold) 
Mechanism S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
OT 39.47 15.52 27.59 28.95 38.46 
PORnp 37.50 45.00 47.50 32.50 60.00 
PORpi 27.50 50.00 42.50 22.50 50.00 
PAC/N 37.50 35.00 35.00 22.50 45.00 
PAC 36.84 52.63 23.68 21.05 42.11 
PAS 25.64 23.08 33.33 10.26 17.95 
PAI 36.84 52.63 36.84 34.21 52.63 
 
To test for effects of mechanisms on overall revealed level of risk aversion we created 
a new variable, the total number of times an individual chose the risky option. This (“Total”) 
variable takes integer values from 0 to 5. The distributions of this overall level of risk 
aversion across different protocols are displayed in Figure 2. The Kruskal-Wallis rank test 
rejects at 1% significance level (p-value is 0.003) the null hypothesis that observations of the 
variable Total observed across mechanisms come from the same population. 
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Figure 2. Distributions of Total Choices of Risky Options 
  
The above tests use aggregated data. To retrieve information from data at the 
individual level we ran probit regressions  with subject clusters to correct for correlated errors 
across choice tasks within an individual and with robust standard errors to accommodate 
heteroscedasticity.
5
  Table 3 reports results from probit estimations of the probability of 
choosing the risky lottery in a pair. We will discuss results from the Probit 3 column. The 
alternatives, Probit 1 and Probit 2 differ from Probit 3 by exclusion of some of the right-hand 
variables. We include these alternative specifications in the table in order to show that our 
central conclusions about mechanism effects are robust to alternative specifications of the 
estimation model. 
The right hand variables in Probit 3 include difference between expected values (EV 
Difference) and difference between variances (VAR Difference) of payoffs in a pair of 
lotteries. The estimated coefficient for EV Difference is not significant.
6
 The estimated 
coefficient for VAR Difference is significantly negative; the sign confirms that subjects’ 
                                                          
5
Probit regressions with random effects and bootstrapped standard errors report the same results with 
respect to significance of the regressors that are reported in Table 3. 
 
6
Differences in expected values between options within a pair were $0.25,  $0.5 and $2. At these small 
differences it is expected that this variable will have low explanatory power. 
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choices respond to differences in variance of returns, revealing aversion to risk: the more risky 
the riskier option is relative to the safer one the less likely the riskier option is to be chosen.  
 
Table 3. Probit Analysis of Choice Data with Robust Standard Errors 
VARIABLES Probit 1 Probit 2 Probit 3 
EV Difference 0.094  0.099 
 (0.360)  (0.352) 
VAR Difference -0.032***  -0.034*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004) 
Field Study  0.080* 0.080* 
  (0.075) (0.080) 
Birth Order  0.092** 0.093** 
  (0.040) (0.040) 
Female  -0.309*** -0.314*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Black  -0.138 -0.142 
  (0.121) (0.117) 
Older than 21  0.157* 0.162* 
  (0.085) (0.080) 
DPORnp -0.445*** -0.369*** -0.384*** 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.006) 
DPORpi -0.288** -0.275** -0.289** 
 (0.039) (0.050) (0.043) 
DPAC -0.202 -0.263* -0.279* 
 (0.187) (0.090) (0.077) 
DPAC/N -0.196 -0.268* -0.285** 
 (0.184) (0.053) (0.043) 
DPAS 0.193 0.149 0.137 
 (0.259) (0.380) (0.428) 
DPAI -0.397*** -0.468*** -0.489*** 
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) 
Constant 0.771*** 0.394** 0.606*** 
 (0.000) (0.023) (0.001) 
Observations 
(nr. of clusters) 
 
1,406 
(466) 
1,406 
(466) 
1,406 
(466) 
BIC’
7
 6.308 6.637 1.919 
            P-values in parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Some other right-hand variables are demographic controls for factors commonly 
associated with across-subjects differences in risk attitudes.
8
  The subjects’ field of study is 
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 By the criterion BIC’ (Bayesian information criterion), the Probit 3 model is preferred to the other 
two probit models.  
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 Birth order has previously been reported as a significant determinant of risk attitudes (Yiannakis, 
1976; Nixon, 1981; and Jobe, et al.,2006).  Female subjects have previously been reported to be more 
risk averse than male subjects (Yiannakis, 1976; Nixon, 1981; Jobe, et al., 2006; Croson and Gneezy, 
2009; and Castillo, et al., 2011).  Black subjects have previously been reported to be less risk averse 
that whites (Castillo, et al., 2011). 
9 
 
coded 1 to 4 for subjects whose major is in natural science/engineering, economics/business, 
social science, and undecided, respectively. Students majoring in Social Sciences appear to be 
less risk averse than others. Arguably the job market favors students who study natural 
sciences and engineering; so students who choose Social Science majors are taking more risks 
in the job market. The subject’s Birth Order is significant; subjects who were an older sibling 
were less likely to choose the risky lottery than a younger sibling or only child. Female 
subjects were less likely to choose the risky lottery. Probability of choosing the risky lottery 
was not significantly affected by a subject’s race (Black).  Being older than 21 years affects 
positively the likelihood of the risky option being chosen.   
The other variables used in the probit estimations are dummy variables for multiple 
decision payoff mechanism treatments. All mechanism treatment dummy variables equal 0 for 
OT data. Otherwise, a value equal to 1 for any one of the multiple decision payoff mechanism 
dummy variables selects data for that mechanism. The coefficients for all of the dummy 
variables for multiple decision payoff mechanisms except PAS and PAC are negative at 5% 
significance; PAC is negative at 8% significance. This provides support for the finding that 
subjects are less likely to choose the risky option (they appear to be more risk averse) with all 
multiple decision payoff mechanisms except PAS than they are with the OT (one task) 
protocol. 
The PAS mechanism produces data that clearly differ from data elicited by other 
multiple decision mechanisms. We tested for differences between the dummy variable 
coefficient estimates for PAS and those for other mechanisms. Correcting for multiple tests 
with the same data, we find that the dummy variable coefficient estimate for PAS is different 
from the estimate for PORpi (0.093), PORnp (0.014), PAI (0.006) and PAC5 (0.098), where 
the figures in parentheses are Bonferroni-adjusted p-values.  The estimate for PAC (0.163) is 
not different from the one for PAS.  
In addition, to get an overall level of risk aversion induced by each protocol, after 
running probit for each protocol, we simulated predicted probability of choosing the risky 
option.
9
  Simulations after probit estimations report that the probability of the risky option 
being chosen is  0.72,  0.56, 0.62, 0.67, 0.65, 0.80 and 0.57 respectively, for OT, PORnp, 
PORpi, PAC/N, PAC, PAS and PAI data. According to these figures PORnp and PAI seem to 
induce more risk averse behavior whereas OT and PAS induce less risk averse behavior. Note 
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 Explanatory variables were set at their means; the number of simulated parameters was 1000  for 
each regressor. Clarify software was used to generate predicted probabilities of the risky option being 
chosen and their 95% Confidence Intervals. 
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that the 95% significance intervals for OT and PAS are disjoint from the one for PORnp and 
(nearly from) the one for PAI.  
 
         Table 4.  95% Confidence Intervals for Risky Choice Probabilities 
 
Mechanism Pr(choice=R) Std. Error [95%  Conf. Interval] 
OT 0.721 0.031 [.661, .781] 
PORnp 0.560 0.036 [.490,   .628] 
PORpi 0.621 0.038 [.544,   .693] 
PAC/N 0.666 0.039 [.588,   .742] 
PAC 0.651 0.046 [.553 ,  .736] 
PAS 0.804 0.039 [.717,  .872] 
PAI 0.574 0.047 [.483,   .663] 
 
The differences between revealed risk preferences elicited by the seven payoff 
mechanisms are inconsistent with the belief that subjects isolate on each decision in multiple 
decision experiments. The data provide support for the alternative view that the payoff 
mechanism chosen by the experimenter can affect risk preferences revealed by the subjects. 
This calls for researching the properties of alternative mechanisms. We do this in three ways: 
(1) we examine the theoretical properties of alternative mechanisms; (2) we identify some 
behavioral properties of mechanisms that differ from their theoretical properties; and (3) we 
use data from alternative mechanisms to test for properties of revealed risk preferences that 
are fundamental to testing theories of decision under risk.  
 
3.  Theoretical Properties of Incentive Mechanisms 
Lotteries will often be represented by (X1, p1; …; Xm, pm), indicating that outcome Xs 
is obtained with probability ps, for s = 1,2, …, m. Outcome Xs can be a monetary amount or a 
lottery. Consider experiments that include n questions in which the subject has to choose 
between Options Ai and Bi, for i = 1,…,n.  The choice of the subject in question i will be 
denoted by Ci.    
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3.1 The Pay All Sequentially (PAS) Mechanism 
 
We begin with the most widely used mechanism, PAS. Because, with PAS, each 
decision is paid before a subsequent decision is made, there is no opportunity for subjects to 
construct risk-diversifying portfolios; hence there is no (theoretical) concern about possible 
portfolio effects with this mechanism. Nevertheless, it is easy to see that PAS is not 
theoretically incentive compatible for the expected utility of terminal wealth model. A simple 
example – referred to as Example 1 in the subsequent analysis – can be used to illustrate 
possible wealth effects with PAS. Let the utility of payoff in amount x be given by u(x) = x . 
Consider two choice options: Option A, with a sure payoff of $30, and Option B with a 50/50 
payoff of $100 or 0.  If the agent would play the lotteries of Example 1 under PAS two times, 
the optimal strategy for the given utility function would be to choose Option B in the first 
choice and Option B (resp. Option A) in the second choice if the outcome of the first choice 
was 100 (resp. 0). This possible wealth effect of PAS is not relevant to the expected utility of 
income model
10
 or the expected utility of terminal wealth model with constant absolute risk 
aversion (CARA) or the dual theory of expected utility (Yaari, 1987) or reference dependent 
preferences for which the reference point adjusts immediately after paying out the first choice.  
 
3.2 The Pay All Independently (PAI) Mechanism 
 
In the PAI mechanism, at the end of the experiment all tasks are played out 
independently. Theoretically, PAI has a problem, well known as portfolio effect in the finance 
literature: the risk of a mixture of two independent random variables is less than the risk of 
each variable in isolation. Due to this risk reduction effect, PAI is theoretically incentive 
compatible only in the case of risk neutrality. To illustrate this fact consider again Example 1 
in the previous subsection. An expected utility maximizer with utility function u(x) = x  
prefers Option A ($30 for sure) to Option B (a coin-flip between $100 and $0). When 
presenting the choice between A and B twice under PAI, however, Option B would be chosen 
both times since the resulting lottery ($200, 0.25; $100, 0.5; $0, 0.25) has a higher utility than 
$60 for sure.  
3.3 The Pay One Randomly (PORnp and PORpi) Mechanisms 
 
Here each question usually has a 1/n chance of being played out for real. Suppose a 
subject conforms to the reduction of compound lotteries axiom and that she has made all her 
                                                          
10
 Three distinct expected utility models (including terminal wealth and income) are compared and 
contrasted in Cox and Sadiraj (2006). 
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choices apart from question i. Then, as discussed by Holt (1986), her choice between Ai and 
Bi determines whether she will receive (1/n)Ai + (1-1/n)C or (1/n)Bi + (1-1/n)C, where C = 
(C1, 1/(n-1); …; Ci-1, 1/(n-1); Ci+1, 1/(n-1); …; Cn, 1/(n-1)) is the lottery for which the subject 
receives all her previous choices with equal probability 1/(n-1). Consequently, a subject 
whose preferences satisfy the reduction and independence axioms has an incentive to reveal 
her preferences truthfully because under those axioms Ai  Bi if and only if (1/n)Ai + (1-
1/n)C  (1/n)Bi + (1-1/n)C.  So, both versions of POR are theoretically incentive compatible 
for all theories that assume the reduction and independence axioms whereas PAS and PAI are 
not.   
 The above result does not imply that (either version of) POR is theoretically 
appropriate for testing other theories that do not include the independence axiom. Consider 
again the lotteries (presented twice) and utility of payoff function in Example 1 but now 
assume rank dependent utility theory (RDU) with probability transformation function f(p) = 
p
0.9 
for the probability of getting the high payoff in a binary lottery. Under (either version of) 
POR and the reduction of compound lotteries axiom, Option A would be chosen in one task 
and Option B would be chosen in the other task because the resulting lottery ($100, 0.25; $30, 
0.5; $0, 0.25) has a higher utility than $30 for sure. It is true that in PORnp an RDU agent 
would not know that he will be asked to choose between A and B but the distortion of choices 
is still present. The first time the subject is asked to choose between A and B he chooses A 
(which is truthful revelation). Having chosen A the first time, choosing B the second time is 
preferred to choosing A for the same reason stated above. Therefore (either version of) POR is 
not theoretically incentive compatible for rank dependent utility theory. 
It has been argued in the literature that it is quite unlikely that subjects’ behavior 
conforms to the reduction axiom because it (arguably) requires too much mental effort. 
Instead, avoidance of cognitive effort may lead subjects into some type of “narrow 
bracketing.” The opposite extreme from reduction is provided by the isolation hypothesis: 
here, subjects evaluate each option choice independently of the other option choices in the 
experiment. Given validity of this isolation hypothesis, both versions of POR and all of the 
other mechanisms would be incentive compatible also for preferences violating the 
independence axiom.  
 
3.4 The Pay All Correlated (PAC and PAC/N) Mechanisms 
 
The independence axiom implies that both versions of POR are incentive compatible. 
In contrast, the preference revelation properties of PAC and PAC/N depend on the dual 
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independence axiom (Yaari, 1987). With these mechanisms, preferences are revealed 
truthfully if dual independence is satisfied, otherwise an additional assumption like isolation 
is required.    
For the PAC and PAC/N mechanisms, states of the world need to be defined (e.g. 
tickets numbered from 1 to 100) and all lotteries need to be arranged in the same order such 
that they are comonotonic. More formally, there are m states indexed by s = 1, 2, …, m and 
lotteries are identified by Ai = (ai1, p1; …; aim, pm) and Bi = (bi1, p1; …; bim, pm) where ais (bis) 
is the outcome of lottery Ai (Bi) in state s and ps is probability of that state. We arrange 
lotteries such that ais ≥ ais+1 and bis ≥ bis+1 for all s = 1, …, m-1 and all i = 1, …, n. At the end 
of the experiment one state is randomly drawn and the outcomes of all chosen lotteries are 
paid out under PAC.  Under PAC/N, the payout is 1/N of the sum of all chosen lotteries’ 
payouts in the randomly selected state. 
Suppose as above that a subject made all choices apart from choice i. Then her choice 
between Ai and Bi will determine whether she will receive either Ai
*
= (ai1 + j≠icj1, p1; …; aim 
+ j≠icjm, pm) or Bi
*
 = (bi1 + j≠icj1, p1; …; bim + j≠icjm, pm) as reward before the state of 
nature is determined. This shows that PAC is incentive compatible under Yaari´s (1987) dual 
theory; a subject whose preferences satisfy the dual independence axiom has an incentive to 
reveal her preferences truthfully because under that axiom Ai  Bi if and only if Ai
*
Bi
*
.  
Moreover, if lotteries are cosigned – i.e. the outcomes in a given state are all gains or all 
losses – PAC is also incentive compatible under linear cumulative prospect theory (Schmidt 
and Zank, 2009) since in this case the independence condition of that model has the same 
implications as the dual independence axiom.  
When we wish to compare PAC with (either version of) POR we have to keep in mind 
that the expected total payoff from the experiment is N times higher under PAC. This may 
have significant effects on behavior. In particular one can expect lower error rates under PAC 
as wrong decisions are more costly (see Laury and Holt, 2008). Therefore, we also include 
PAC/N in our experimental study where the payoff of PAC is divided by the number of tasks. 
PAC/N has the same theoretical properties as PAC and is incentive compatible under the dual 
theory and linear cumulative prospect theory.  
 
3.5 The One Task (OT) Mechanism 
 
So far we can conclude that some payment mechanisms for binary choice are 
theoretically incentive compatible only if utility is linear in probabilities or in outcomes. This 
is not true for the OT mechanism.  With this mechanism, each subject has to respond to only 
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one choice task which is played out for real. Besides being rather costly, this mechanism has 
one obvious disadvantage: OT allows only for tests of hypotheses using between-subjects 
data. OT is nevertheless very interesting because it is the only mechanism that is always (i.e. 
for all possible preferences) incentive compatible.  
 
3.6 Summary of Incentive Compatibility Conditions 
 
Table 5 gives an overview of the discussion in the present section. Either version of 
POR or PAC is incentive compatible if the relevant independence condition holds. PAS is 
incentive compatible for models defined on income. OT is incentive compatible for all 
theories. 
 
Table 5. Incentive Compatibility of Payoff Mechanisms 
 
Preference condition Incentive compatible mechanisms 
All theories OT 
Independence OT, PORpi, PORnp 
Dual independence OT, PAC, PAC/N 
Income models OT, PAS 
 
4. Tests of Classic Properties of Theories of Decision under Risk 
 
We here ask whether the observed differences in patterns of revealed risk preferences 
elicited by the several payoff mechanisms have different implications for classic properties of 
theories of decision under risk.  Allais (1953) first raised a fundamental objection to the 
independence axiom of expected utility theory by constructing thought experiments that seem 
to imply paradoxical outcomes.  Subsequent experiments focused on two behavioral patterns 
that contradict the independence axiom, the common ratio effect (CRE) and common 
consequence effect (CCE).  The lottery pairs in Table 1 are constructed to make it possible to 
observe a CRE with Pairs 2 and 3 or a CCE with Pairs 3 and 4. 
Yaari (1987) introduced the dual independence axiom and constructed an alternative 
theory with functional that is nonlinear in probabilities (unless the agent is risk neutral) and 
linear in payoffs (for all risk attitudes). The dual common ratio effect (DCRE) and dual 
common consequence effect (DCCE) are the dual analogs of CRE and CCE. The lottery pairs 
in Table 1 make it possible to observe a DCRE with Pairs 1 and 3 or a DCCE with Pairs 2 and 
5.   
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4.1 Classic Hypotheses for Risk Preferences 
 
A CRE consists of two lottery pairs where the lotteries in the second pair (Pair 3 in our 
design) are constructed from the lotteries in the first pair (Pair 2 here) by multiplying all 
probabilities by a common factor (1/4 in our study) and assigning the remaining probability to 
a common outcome (in our study $0). It is easy to verify (by using the functional) that, 
according to expected utility theory, either the safe lottery would be chosen in both pairs or 
the risky lottery would be chosen in both pairs.  
A CCE also consists of two lottery pairs. Here, the lotteries in the second pair (Pair 4 
in our design) are constructed from the lotteries in the first pair (Pair 3 here) by shifting 
probability mass (75% in our study) from one common outcome ($0 in our study) to a 
different common outcome ($12 in our study).  It is easy to verify (with the functional) that 
expected utility theory implies that an agent will either choose the safe lottery in both pairs or 
the risky lottery in both pairs.  
The null hypotheses that follow from the independence axiom of expected utility 
theory are that the proportion of choices of the risky option in Pair 3 should be the same as the 
proportions of choices of the risky options in Pairs 2 and 4: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The proportions of choices of the risky option are the same for Pair 2 
and Pair 3 (absence of CRE). 
 
Hypothesis 2: The proportions of choices of the risky option are the same for Pair 3 
and Pair 4 (absence of CCE). 
 
One-sided alternatives to the above hypotheses are provided by fanning-out (Machina, 1982) 
and fanning-in (Neilson, 1992). Subjects’ revealed risk preferences under each mechanism 
can be used to test these hypotheses.  
DCRE and DCCE play the same role for dual theory of expected utility (Yaari, 1987) 
as CRE and CCE for expected utility theory. Because utility is linear under dual theory, it 
exhibits constant absolute and constant relative risk aversion. Consequently, neither 
multiplying all outcomes in a lottery pair by a constant (DCRE, see Pairs 1 and 3 where the 
constant equals 2) nor adding a constant to all outcomes in a lottery pair (DCCE, see Pairs 2 
and 5 where the constant equals $12) should change preferences. Yaari (1987) stated that the 
dual paradoxes could be used to refute his theory analogously to the way in which CRE and 
CCE had been used to refute expected utility theory.  As far as we know, however, the dual 
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paradoxes have never been investigated in a systematic empirical test with a theoretically 
incentive compatible mechanism. 
All payoff amounts in Pair 3 are two times corresponding payoff amounts in Pair 1.  
All payoff amounts in Pair 5 are $12 higher than corresponding payoffs in Pair 2.  Responses 
with each mechanism can be used to analyze behavior with respect to DCRE and DCCE. The 
null hypothesis that follows from the dual independence axiom (which implies linearity in 
payoffs) is that the proportion of choices of the risky option should be: (a) the same in Pairs 1 
and 3; and (b) the same in Pairs 2 and 5. The null hypothesis of choices in Pairs 1 and 3 
coming from the same distribution also follows from a power function for payoffs, with or 
without linearity in probabilities. On the other hand, the null hypothesis of choices in Pairs 2 
and 5 revealing the same distribution is consistent with an exponential function for payoffs. 
Alternative hypotheses are that choices correspond to DRRA or DARA.  Data from each 
mechanism can be used to conduct tests of the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: The proportions of choices of the risky option are the same for Pair 1 
and Pair 3 (CRRA). 
 
Hypothesis 4: The proportions of choices of the risky option are the same for Pair 2 
and Pair 5 (CARA).  
 
One-sided alternatives to Hypothesis 3 are given by decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA) 
and increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA). One-sided alternatives to Hypothesis 4 are 
provided by decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and increasing absolute risk aversion 
(IARA).  
 
4.2 Tests of Hypotheses with Data from Several Mechanisms 
Hypothesis 1 is tested with data from each mechanism as follows.  Probit analysis is 
used to estimate the probability of choosing the risky lottery in Pairs 2 and 3.  Right-hand 
variables include a dummy variable for Pair 3 and dummy variables (discussed above) for 
Field (of) Study, Birth Order, Female, Black, and Older than 21.  The question of interest here 
is whether the dummy variable for Pair 3 is significantly different from 0 and, if so, whether it 
is positive or negative.  Estimates (and two-sided p-values) for all of the variables are reported 
in tables in the appendix. We here report, in Table 6, only whether the dummy variable for 
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Pair 3 (referred to as “Task” in the appendix) is significantly positive or negative; complete 
results from the probit estimation for Hypothesis 1 are reported in appendix Table A.1.   
 
Table 6.  Test Results for Hypotheses 1 - 4 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We find that PAI data are characterized by the fanning out property; the null 
hypothesis of parallel indifference curves is rejected at 5% significance level (one sided p-
value is 0.035) in favor of fanning out of indifference curves since the coefficient for the Pair 
3 dummy variable from the estimation with PAI data is positive.  PAC data are also consistent 
with the fanning out property: the null hypothesis of parallel indifference curves is rejected in 
favor of the fanning out alternative hypothesis at 1% significance level (one-sided p-value is 
.003). Estimated coefficients for Pair 3 with data from all other mechanisms are not 
significantly different from 0 (with two-sided p-values   0.10), so all five of these 
mechanisms produce data that do not reject the hypothesis of parallel indifference curves in 
the probability triangle (absence of CRE). These findings are summarized in Table 5, Pairs 2 
& 3 column. 
Similar probit estimations using data from Pairs 3 and 4 of the probability of choosing 
the risky lottery within a pair are used in the tests of Hypothesis 2 summarized in the Pairs 3 
& 4 column of Table 5 (and complete results are in Table A.2). The estimated coefficients for 
the Pair 4 dummy variable are significant for PORpi data (two-sided p-value = 0.056), PAC/N 
data (two-sided p-value = 0.095), and PAS data (two-sided p-value = 0.003); all of these 
coefficients are positive, which is consistent with indifference curves that fan in. Estimated 
coefficients with data from other mechanisms are insignificantly different from 0, which is 
consistent with parallel indifference curves (absence of CCE).   
Mechanism Pairs 2 & 3 Pairs 3 & 4 Pairs 1 & 3 Pairs 2 & 5 
OT Parallel Parallel CRRA IARA 
PORnp Parallel Parallel CRRA CARA 
PORpi Parallel Fan In IRRA CARA 
PAC/N Parallel Fan In CRRA CARA 
PAC Fan Out Parallel DRRA CARA 
PAS Parallel Fan In CRRA CARA 
PAI Fan Out Parallel CRRA CARA 
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Data from the several mechanisms have different implications for testing expected 
utility theory. Five of the seven mechanisms produce data that are inconsistent with expected 
utility theory because the data either reject CRE or reject CCE. Furthermore, these 
mechanisms produce data that are variously consistent with indifference curves that fan in, fan 
our, or are parallel.   
The test results are less heterogeneous if one looks only at the three mechanisms that 
are theoretically incentive compatible for expected utility theory: OT, PORpi, and PORnp.  
Data from OT and PORnp do not reject either absence of CRE or absence of CCE.  Data from 
the PORpi mechanism, however, reject absence of CCE and are thus inconsistent with 
expected utility theory. 
Results from probit tests of Hypothesis 3 that use choice data for Pairs 1 and 3 from 
each payoff mechanism separately are reported in the Pairs 1 & 3 column of Table 5 (and 
complete results are reported in Table A.3). The estimated coefficients for the Pair 3 dummy 
variable are insignificant with data from all mechanisms except PORpi and PAC, which is 
consistent with revealed risk preferences that exhibit CRRA.  Estimation with data from the 
PAC mechanism yields a coefficient for Pair 3 dummy variable that is significant (two-sided 
p-value = 0.040) and positive, which is consistent with revealed risk preferences that exhibit 
DRRA. In contrast, estimation with data from the PORpi mechanism yields a coefficient for 
Pair 3 dummy variable that is significant (two-sided p-value = 0.039) and negative, which is 
consistent with revealed risk preferences that exhibit IRRA. 
Results from probit tests of Hypothesis 4 are reported in the Pairs 2 & 5 column of 
Table 5 (and complete results are reported in Table A.4). Coefficients for the Pair 4 dummy 
variable are insignificant (two-sided p-values   0.10) with data from all mechanisms except 
OT. Revealed risk preferences with the mechanisms that involve many tasks are consistent 
with CARA.  Estimation with OT data yields a significant coefficient (two-sided p-value = 
0.016) that is negative, which is consistent with preferences that exhibit IARA.   
Data from the several mechanisms have divergent implications for testing for CARA 
and CRRA within the range of payoffs used in the experiment. Data from three mechanisms 
reject either CRRA or CARA whereas data from four mechanisms do not reject either.  The 
three mechanisms that are incentive compatible for dual theory of expected utility are OT, 
PAC, and PAC/N.  Two out of these three incentive compatible mechanisms produce data that 
are inconsistent with dual theory of expected utility because the data are inconsistent with 
either CARA or CRRA.   
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 We have used seven mechanisms to generate revealed risk preference data for five 
lottery pairs that have the potential to test for distinguishing properties of different theories of  
risk preferences. Out of seven mechanisms, only PORnp seems to be producing data that do 
not reject any of the four hypotheses.  
 
5.  Behavioral Properties of Mechanisms 
What can account for these inconsistencies across mechanisms in elicited risk 
preferences?  The probit regressions reported in section 2 show that subjects were responding 
to the properties of lotteries within a pair. Our subjects made choices that reveal risk aversion 
since increase in the difference between variances of returns of the risky and safe lottery had a 
negative effect on the risky option being chosen. Other estimates from the demographics are 
consistent with findings in other studies. The divergent test results can be explained by failure 
of isolation, which would be expected to cause different payoff mechanisms to elicit different 
risk preferences.   
The probit regressions reported in Table 7 for data from Round 1 and Round 5 yield 
further insight into the behavioral properties of the payoff mechanisms.  (The Probit 3 results 
from Table 3 are repeated here for ease of comparison.)  It is important to recall that the 
choice order of the five lottery pairs is randomly and independently selected for each subject.  
Therefore the Round 1 and Round 5 choices reported in Table 7 will each include a random 
selection of distinct lottery pairs.  Hence the dummy variables for protocols in Round 1 and 
Round 5 are picking up choice order effects not lottery pair effects.  
The performance of PAS shows risk preferences that are not different from OT in any 
comparison in Table 7, including all rounds (Probit 3) and Round 1 and Round 5.  This is a 
particularly interesting result because, of all the multi-decision payoff mechanisms, PAS 
would seem to be the one that would most likely exhibit behavior consistent with the isolation 
hypothesis.  The way in which PAS might exhibit cross-task contamination would be if there 
were a significant wealth effect on risk preferences, in which case risk preferences elicited in 
a subsequent round would not be independent of choices and outcomes in earlier rounds.   
Probit analysis of data from our experiment that includes total payoff from lotteries chosen in 
earlier periods, as an explanatory variable for choice between risky and safe options in the 
current period, finds no significance of the estimated coefficient for this wealth variable (see 
the result reported in the Variable X coefficient row and PAS column of Table 8). This 
finding is consistent with earlier detailed analyses of possible wealth effects in other 
experiments that use PAS (Cox and Epstein, 1989; Cox and Grether, 1996). 
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Table 7. Probit Analysis of Rounds 1 & 5 Choice Data with Robust Standard Errors 
 
VARIABLES Probit 3 Round 1 Round 5 
EV Difference 0.099 0.068 0.109 
 (0.352) (0.703) (0.543) 
VAR Difference -0.034*** -0.015 -0.018 
 (0.004) (0.495) (0.395) 
Field Study 0.080* 0.046 0.030 
 (0.080) (0.520) (0.678) 
Birth Order 0.093** 0.120** 0.131** 
 (0.040) (0.048) (0.034) 
Female -0.314*** -0.159 -0.296** 
 (0.000) (0.221) (0.024) 
Black -0.142 -0.139 -0.195 
 (0.117) (0.276) (0.128) 
Older than 21 0.162* -0.004 0.162 
 (0.080) (0.975) (0.218) 
DPORnp -0.384*** -0.677*** -0.497** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.028) 
DPORpi -0.289** -0.213 -0.530** 
 (0.043) (0.343) (0.017) 
DPAC -0.279* -0.263 -0.452** 
 (0.077) (0.250) (0.046) 
DPAC/N -0.285** -0.452** -0.068 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.772) 
DPAS 0.137 0.125 0.198 
 (0.428) (0.604) (0.425) 
DPAI -0.489*** -0.460** -0.538** 
 (0.001) (0.043) (0.020) 
Constant 0.606*** 0.463* 0.494* 
 (0.001) (0.074) (0.052) 
Observations 1,406 466 466 
Log-likelihood -885.0 -874.3 -864.7 
             P-values in parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In Section 3 we provided some examples that illustrate the possible lack of incentive 
compatibility of mechanisms for different theories. Those examples offer insights on cross-
task effects that different mechanisms might induce.  We shall be testing for cross-task effects 
when a subject saw the tasks relevant to the hypothesis one right after the other. The example 
in section 3 for the PAS mechanism suggests that the payoff received in the preceding round 
is expected to have a positive effect on the likelihood of choosing the risky option in the 
current round. Probit regression reported in Table 8 using PAS data, however, reveal that the 
payoff in the immediately preceding round (see the Preceding Payoff (PAS) row) does not 
affect the likelihood of the risky option being chosen in the current round; the estimate is 
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positive (0.026) but the (two-sided) p-value is 0.137.  This shows that PAS data reject a cross-
task effect of this type, an effect of the most recent lottery (or sure) payoff.  
 
Table 8. Probit Tests of Cross-Task Effects 
 
Variables / Mechanism 
 
 
Variable X 
 
PORnp 
(CRE) 
 
Dummy for 
Pair 3 
PORnp 
(CCE) 
 
Dummy for 
Pair 4 
PAS 
 
 
Accumulated 
Payoff 
PAI 
 
 
Accumulated nr of 
times option R choice 
Variable X coefficient -0.686 1.411** -0.004 0.215* 
 (0.164) (0.027) (0.698) (0.073) 
EV differences   0.788** -0.279 
   (0.013) (0.297) 
VAR differences   -0.095*** -0.003 
   (0.003) (0.914) 
Field Study -0.009 0.382* 0.232 -0.089 
 (0.973) (0.072) (0.113) (0.584) 
Birth Order 0.204 0.298 0.078 0.191 
 (0.468) (0.285) (0.645) (0.168) 
Female -0.228 -1.060 -0.706*** -0.027 
 (0.733) (0.177) (0.009) (0.915) 
Black -0.293 -0.478 0.493 -0.281 
 (0.564) (0.473) (0.134) (0.259) 
Older than 21 0.035 0.681 -0.058 0.915*** 
 (0.947) (0.476) (0.829) (0.001) 
Preceding Payoff (PAS)   0.026  
   (0.137)  
Preceding Choice (PAI)    -0.309 
    (0.275) 
Constant 0.608 -0.619 0.263 -0.444 
 (0.465) (0.381) (0.663) (0.148) 
Observations 32 32 195 190 
Log-Likelihood -19.35 -13.96 -90.68 -116.5 
p-values in parentheses: *** denotes p<0.01; ** denotes p<0.05; * denotes p<0.1 
 
Results differ for the two implementations of POR. Consider first the highly 
significant, negative coefficient on the PORnp dummy variable for Round 1 reported in Table 
7.  In Round 1, subjects in the PORnp experimental treatment have the same lack of previous 
experience with lottery pair choices and the same information about lottery pairs as subjects in 
the OT treatment. But the highly significant negative coefficient on the Round 1 dummy 
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variable shows that PORnp elicited much more risk averse preferences in the first round than 
did the OT mechanism. The only difference between these two treatments in Round 1 is that 
in PORnp subjects had been informed that there would be subsequent choices and that one 
choice would be randomly selected for payoff.  This information, itself, led to much more 
aversion to risk in the preferences elicited in Round 1.  
The alternative implementation of random selection, the PORpi mechanism, yielded 
quite different results in Round 1. Here, the estimated coefficient for the Round 1 dummy 
variable is insignificant. Recall that the difference in subjects’ information across the  PORnp 
and PORni mechanisms at the time of a Round 1 choice consists entirely of their knowing in 
PORpi what the subsequent lottery choice pairs will be and their not having this information 
in PORnp. Together, these results suggest that the uncertainty about future choice options that 
subjects faced in PORnp caused them to behave as if they were more risk averse in Round 1.  
The Round 5 results look very different.  Here, the dummy variable coefficients for 
PORnp and PORni are almost identical.  But in Round 5 subjects in both treatments knew that 
this would be their last decision.  With both versions of the random selection mechanism, the 
subjects were significantly more risk averse than in OT in the last round. 
POR is immune to preceding-payoff cross-task effects because no lottery payoff is 
realized before any choice is made. In order to test for cross-task effects with POR, we test for 
choice order effects on revelation of classical paradoxes. In this case, as with PAS, we look at 
adjacent choices but now we focus on the case in which the pairs involved in a paradox were 
faced by a subject one right after the other. If there is any cross-task effect of this type one 
would expect it to be weaker in PORpi because subjects have already seen all five pairs in 
advance with this implementation of the mechanism.  The data support this conjecture. As 
shown in Table 5, PORnp does not reveal CRE or CCE when all data are used. In contrast, as 
shown in Table 8 (Variable X Coefficient row), if we focus only on adjacent choices then 
PORnp reveals a CCE (p-value = 0.027) effect but not a CRE (p-value = 0.164) effect. For 
PORpi data, however, conclusions with respect to paradoxes are robust to tests with all data or 
tests only with adjacent round data.  This result is inconsistent with the Round 1 and Round 5 
effects on choices observed in PORnp. Both approaches to data analysis support the 
conclusion that PORnp data are characterized by choice order effects.     
Comparison of the estimated coefficients for PAC and PAC/N in Table 7 also yields 
behavioral insight into mechanism effects. Recall that the only difference between these two 
mechanisms is the scale of payoffs; experimental treatments with these two mechanisms are 
otherwise identical.  Subjects in the PAC and PAC/N treatments have the same information 
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about lotteries in Round 1 and Round 5 as do subjects in the PORpi treatment.  Expected 
payoffs for PAC are N times as large as for PORpi; they are the same for PAC/N and PORpi.  
Risky choice behavior in PAC follows the same pattern as in PORpi, with no significant 
difference from OT in Round 1 but significantly more risk averse behavior by Round 5.  
PAC/N follows the reverse pattern, with significantly more revealed risk aversion than OT in 
Round 1 but no difference from OT in Round 5.  
The section 3 example of possible portfolio effects from the PAI mechanism shows 
how, with uncorrelated lotteries, a portfolio with several risky options may be preferred to 
other portfolios even when the agent prefers the safe lottery to the risky lottery in isolation.  If 
so, then we should observe that a current choice of the risky option has a positive effect on the 
likelihood of the risky option being chosen latter. Data are consistent with this conjecture.  
Probit regression reported in Table 8 (Variable X coefficient row) shows a positive effect 
(two-sided p-value is 0.073) of the previous total number (“Accumulated nr”) of choices of 
the risky option on the likelihood of choosing the risky option in the current decision task. 
 
6.  Summary 
 
Experiments on choice under risk typically involve multiple decisions by individual 
subjects and use of a payoff mechanism to implement incentive payoffs. If subjects isolate 
each individual decision from other decisions then choice of payoff mechanism is an 
unimportant detail of experimental protocols. Our data imply rejection of the hypothesis that 
subjects’ revealed risk preferences are generally isolated from mechanism effects. Our data 
also reveal that different mechanisms elicit data that have different implications for 
fundamental properties of decision theories such as the independence axiom vs. fanning in or 
fanning out as well as risk preference patterns such as CRRA and CARA. 
PORni and PORpi are theoretically incentive compatible for testing hypotheses from 
expected utility theory.  However, the changes in elicited risk preferences across rounds in our 
experiment raise serious questions about the behavioral properties of these two alternative 
implementations of this random decision selection mechanism.  In contrast, PAS elicited risk 
preferences that did not change between rounds. This reflects the absence of significant 
wealth effects found in this study and in two previous studies that carefully analyzed PAS 
data for wealth effects. Our PAS data also do not exhibit a preceding-round outcome effect on 
current option choice.  Thus, our PAS data are consistent with subjects’ isolation on each one 
of multiple decisions. 
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Empirical failure of isolation from mechanism effects can be especially a problem for 
design of experiments to test theories such as rank dependent utility theory, cumulative 
prospect theory, and betweenness theories that do not include either the independence axiom 
or the dual independence axiom. The one task (OT) mechanism avoids any possible cross-task 
contamination and is the only known theoretically incentive compatible payoff protocol to use 
in experiments designed to test all theories. But OT has significant limitations in that it is 
expensive to use in experiments and it requires that all hypothesis tests be conducted between 
subjects.  The PAS mechanism elicits data in our experiment that do not differ significantly 
from OT data. This suggests that PAS may be a good choice of mechanism for testing 
hypotheses from theories such as cumulative prospect theory that are defined on income rather 
than terminal wealth. Possible wealth effects from PAS make it theoretically questionable for 
testing hypotheses for theories such as rank dependent utility theory that are defined on 
terminal wealth and which do not include the independence axiom.  But data reported here, 
and results in two previous studies that analyzed PAS data for wealth effects (Cox and 
Epstein, 1989; Cox and Grether, 1996), found that wealth effects were insignificant. This 
provides behavioral support for use of PAS to elicit risk preferences in experiments testing 
hypotheses from rank dependent utility theory and similar theories defined on terminal 
wealth.   
 The finding that the data are not generally consistent with the isolation hypothesis 
makes clear the importance of systematic study of the properties of alternative payoff 
mechanisms and the relationship of those properties to validity of conclusions about theory 
that can be drawn from data.  Our experiment is a step in the direction of such study.  
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Appendix 1: Probit Tests of Hypotheses 1 - 4 
 
Table A.1. Probit Tests of Hypothesis 1 
Variables / Mechanism OT PORnp PORpi PAC/N PAC PAS 
 
PAI 
 
Task -0.443 -0.059 0.206 -0.000 0.827*** -0.321 0.498* 
 (0.113) (0.851) (0.425) (0.999) (0.005) (0.311) (0.069) 
Field Study 0.060 0.121 0.198 0.273* 0.245 0.370** -0.098 
 (0.715) (0.405) (0.254) (0.081) (0.190) (0.032) (0.709) 
Birth order 0.194 0.190 -0.024 0.185 -0.202 0.083 0.228 
 (0.117) (0.167) (0.883) (0.159) (0.210) (0.639) (0.205) 
Female -0.123 -0.458 -0.026 -0.106 -0.306 -0.835*** -0.466 
 (0.683) (0.119) (0.941) (0.689) (0.379) (0.008) (0.225) 
Black -0.275 -0.288 -0.242 -0.248 -0.329 0.374 -0.330 
 (0.333) (0.288) (0.443) (0.375) (0.359) (0.300) (0.400) 
Older than 21 0.032 -0.303 0.544 0.273 -0.178 0.113 1.820*** 
 (0.907) (0.242) (0.114) (0.282) (0.589) (0.700) (0.000) 
Constant 0.708 0.027 -0.476 -0.611 0.181 0.027 -1.612*** 
 (0.159) (0.951) (0.507) (0.257) (0.761) (0.970) (0.004) 
Nobs 116 80 80 80 76 78 76 
Log-likelihood -57.37 -52.00 -52.34 -48.47 -44.53 -41.11 -42.81 
p-values in parentheses: *** denotes p<0.01; ** denotes p<0.05; * denotes p<0.1 
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Table A.2. Probit Tests of Hypothesis 2 
Variables / Mechanism OT PORnp PORpi PAC/N PAC PAS PAI 
Task -0.052 0.419 0.594* 0.422* 0.074 1.079*** 0.049 
 (0.858) (0.241) (0.056) (0.095) (0.826) (0.003) (0.875) 
Field Study -0.149 0.278*** 0.135 0.169 0.042 0.406* -0.229 
 (0.409) (0.009) (0.428) (0.419) (0.825) (0.053) (0.295) 
Birth Order 0.317** 0.180 0.162 0.002 -0.028 -0.041 0.373** 
 (0.019) (0.166) (0.307) (0.989) (0.861) (0.847) (0.041) 
Female -0.225 -0.630** -0.005 -0.606* 0.022 -1.597*** -0.625* 
 (0.460) (0.010) (0.988) (0.096) (0.950) (0.000) (0.069) 
Black 0.035 -0.381 -0.222 -0.345 -0.699** 0.266 -0.043 
 (0.907) (0.144) (0.466) (0.352) (0.034) (0.511) (0.896) 
Older than 21 0.264 0.054 0.441 0.689* 0.247 0.023 0.448 
 (0.356) (0.857) (0.154) (0.081) (0.439) (0.952) (0.221) 
Constant 0.252 -0.268 -0.548 0.073 0.824 0.515 -0.008 
 (0.636) (0.532) (0.369) (0.919) (0.132) (0.557) (0.986) 
Nobs 96 80 80 80 76 78 76 
Log-Likelihood -53.28 -47.81 -46.51 -42.04 -37.86 -29.19 -44.10 
        
p-values in parentheses: *** denotes p<0.01; ** denotes p<0.05; * denotes p<0.1 
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Table A.3. Probit Tests of Hypothesis 3 
Variables / Mechanism OT PORnp PORpi PAC/N PAC PAS PAI 
Task 0.348 -0.357 -0.497** 0.081 0.428** -0.260 0.021 
 (0.208) (0.197) (0.039) (0.735) (0.040) (0.387) (0.935) 
Field Study -0.090 -0.017 -0.135 0.408** 0.158 0.256 -0.237 
 (0.596) (0.927) (0.556) (0.033) (0.476) (0.222) (0.374) 
Birth Order 0.170 0.286 0.055 0.113 -0.194 -0.165 0.440** 
 (0.187) (0.139) (0.783) (0.487) (0.356) (0.353) (0.034) 
Female 0.006 -1.399*** -0.295 -0.375 0.323 -1.286*** -0.322 
 (0.982) (0.000) (0.416) (0.317) (0.436) (0.001) (0.395) 
Black -0.121 0.105 -0.646* -0.406 -0.643 0.869* -0.219 
 (0.659) (0.753) (0.076) (0.249) (0.119) (0.053) (0.583) 
Older than 21 0.098 0.046 0.788** 0.838** 0.239 0.152 1.115** 
 (0.726) (0.913) (0.037) (0.030) (0.564) (0.672) (0.031) 
Constant 0.092 0.610 0.971 -0.931 0.332 0.865 -0.800 
 (0.866) (0.277) (0.222) (0.134) (0.626) (0.196) (0.235) 
Nobs 96 80 80 80 76 78 76 
Log-likelihood -58.60 -43.17 -44.24 -43.40 -42.49 -38.54 -42.81 
p-values in parentheses: *** denotes p<0.01; ** denotes p<0.05; * denotes p<0.1 
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Table A.4. Probit Tests of Hypothesis 4 
Variables / Mechanism OT PORnp PORpi PAC/N PAC PAS PAI 
Task -0.756** -0.393 -0.000 -0.288 0.289 0.165 -0.001 
 (0.016) (0.108) (0.999) (0.279) (0.270) (0.474) (0.998) 
Field Study 0.374** -0.040 -0.003 0.199 0.220 0.214 0.140 
 (0.046) (0.810) (0.986) (0.328) (0.267) (0.224) (0.597) 
Birth Order 0.002 -0.139 -0.125 0.262 -0.036 0.246 -0.047 
 (0.986) (0.441) (0.497) (0.124) (0.841) (0.303) (0.819) 
Female 0.188 -0.187 -0.074 -0.483 -0.539 -0.138 0.374 
 (0.598) (0.593) (0.843) (0.143) (0.117) (0.716) (0.339) 
Black -0.619* -0.245 -0.028 -0.022 0.427 0.304 -0.531 
 (0.078) (0.470) (0.942) (0.950) (0.245) (0.483) (0.185) 
Older than 21 -0.129 -0.546 0.109 -0.337 0.083 -0.121 + 
 (0.689) (0.117) (0.765) (0.352) (0.798) (0.749)  
Constant 0.615 0.887 0.303 -0.142 -0.440 -0.245 0.033 
 (0.264) (0.142) (0.700) (0.817) (0.401) (0.782) (0.962) 
Observations 97 80 80 80 76 78 66 
Log-likelihood -46.72 -52.46 -54.91 -48.87 -49.45 -37.52 -43.70 
p-values in parentheses: *** denotes p<0.01; ** denotes p<0.05; * denotes p<0.1; +  Younger than 21 predicts 
“choice S” perfectly, so it is not included here.  
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Appendix 2: Subject Instructions 
Subject Instructions (OT) 
In this experiment, you are asked to choose between two options. The example below shows 
two options that are similar to ones on the decision page. 
In Option A you receive either $3 or $10. Your payoff is determined by drawing one 
ball from a bingo cage containing 20 balls numbered 1, 2, 3, …, 20.  If a ball with number 1 to 
4  is drawn then you receive $3. If a ball with number 5 to 20 is drawn then you receive $10.  
In Option B you receive either $5 or $7 or $8. Your payoff is determined by drawing 
one ball from a bingo cage that contains 20 balls numbered 1, 2, 3, …, 20.  If a ball with 
number 1 to 3 is drawn then you receive $5. If a ball with number 4 to 7 is drawn then you 
receive $7. If a ball with numbers 8 to 20 is drawn then you receive $8.  
 
Ball nr 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Option A $3 $10 
Option B $5 $7 $8 
 
Making Choices  Please make your choice by clicking on Option A or Option B 
 
Payoffs After you make a decision, your chosen option will be played.  Your payoff in the 
option you selected will be determined by drawing a ball from a bingo cage that contains balls 
numbered 1,2,3,…,20. 
 
Subject Instructions (PAC) 
In this experiment, you are asked to choose between two options on each of five decision 
pages. On each decision page you will choose between a different pair of options. The 
example below shows two options that are similar to ones on decision pages.  
In Option A you receive either $3 or $10. Your payoff is determined by drawing one 
ball from a bingo cage containing 20 balls numbered 1, 2, 3, …, 20.  If a ball with number 1 to 
4  is drawn then you receive $3. If a ball with number 5 to 20 is drawn then you receive $10.  
In Option B you receive either $5 or $7 or $8. Your payoff is determined by drawing 
one ball from a bingo cage that contains 20 balls numbered 1, 2, 3, …, 20.  If a ball with 
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number 1 to 3 is drawn then you receive $5. If a ball with number 4 to 7 is drawn then you 
receive $7. If a ball with numbers 8 to 20 is drawn then you receive $8.  
 
Ball nr 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Option A $3 $10 
Option B $5 $7 $8 
 
Making Choices  Please make your choice on each of the five decision pages by clicking on 
Option A or Option B 
 
Payoffs After you make a decision on each of the five decision pages, all your chosen options 
will be played as follows.  One numbered ball will be drawn from a bingo cage that contains 
balls numbered 1,2,3,…,20.  The ball drawn determines your payoff from the option you 
chose on all five decision pages.   
Your total payoff is the sum of your payoffs from all five decision pages; all payoffs are 
determined by the one ball drawn. 
Subject Instructions (POR) 
In this experiment, you are asked to choose between two options on each of five decision 
pages. On each decision page you will choose between a different pair of options. The 
example below shows two options that are similar to ones on decision pages.  
In Option A you receive either $3 or $10. Your payoff is determined by drawing one 
ball from a bingo cage containing 20 balls numbered 1, 2, 3, …, 20.  If a ball with number 1 to 
4  is drawn then you receive $3. If a ball with number 5 to 20 is drawn then you receive $10.  
In Option B you receive either $5 or $7 or $8. Your payoff is determined by drawing 
one ball from a bingo cage that contains 20 balls numbered 1, 2, 3, …, 20.  If a ball with 
number 1 to 3 is drawn then you receive $5. If a ball with number 4 to 7 is drawn then you 
receive $7. If a ball with numbers 8 to 20 is drawn then you receive $8.  
Ball nr 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Option A $3 $10 
Option B $5 $7 $8 
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Making Choices Please make your choice on each of the five decision pages by clicking on 
Option A or Option B 
 
Payoffs  After you make a decision on each of the five decision pages, one of the pages will 
be randomly selected and your chosen option on that page will be played. The selection of the 
page is carried out by drawing a ball from a bingo cage that contains five balls numbered 
1,2,3,4,5. The number on the drawn ball determines the decision page that is selected.   
 After the one page is randomly selected, your money payoff will be determined by playing 
the lottery in the option you selected on that page. Your payoff in the option you selected will 
be determined by drawing a ball from a bingo cage that contains balls numbered 1,2,3,…,20. 
 
Subject Instructions (PAS) 
In this experiment, you are asked to choose between two options on each of five decision 
pages. On each decision page you will choose between a different pair of options. The 
example below shows two options that are similar to ones on decision pages.  
In Option A you receive either $3 or $10. Your payoff is determined by drawing one 
ball from a bingo cage containing 20 balls numbered 1, 2, 3, …, 20.  If a ball with number 1 to 
4  is drawn then you receive $3. If a ball with number 5 to 20 is drawn then you receive $10.  
In Option B you receive either $5 or $7 or $8. Your payoff is determined by drawing 
one ball from a bingo cage that contains 20 balls numbered 1, 2, 3, …, 20.  If a ball with 
number 1 to 3 is drawn then you receive $5. If a ball with number 4 to 7 is drawn then you 
receive $7. If a ball with numbers 8 to 20 is drawn then you receive $8.  
 
Ball nr 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Option A $3 $10 
Option B $5 $7 $8 
 
Making your First Page Choice Please make your choice on the first decision page by 
clicking on Option A or Option B 
 
First Page Payoff  A numbered ball is drawn from a bingo cage that contains balls numbered 
1,2,3…,20. The ball drawn determines your payoff from the option you chose on the first 
page. The drawn ball is returned to the bingo cage. Then you turn to the next decision page. 
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Making your Choices and Determining Payoffs on Subsequent Pages 
Make your choice on page 2. Then a ball is drawn to determine your payoff. The ball is 
returned to the bingo cage. Next, you make your choice on page 3. Another ball is drawn and 
then returned to the bingo cage. This process continues until your choices and payoffs have 
been determined for all five decision pages. Your total payoff is the sum of your payoffs from 
all five decision pages that are determined by the sequence of choices  and independently 
drawn balls. 
 
Subject Instructions (PAI) 
In this experiment, you are asked to choose between two options on each of five decision 
pages. On each decision page you will choose between a different pair of options. The 
example below shows two options that are similar to ones on decision pages.  
In Option A you receive either $3 or $10. Your payoff is determined by drawing one 
ball from a bingo cage containing 20 balls numbered 1, 2, 3, …, 20.  If a ball with number 1 to 
4  is drawn then you receive $3. If a ball with number 5 to 20 is drawn then you receive $10.  
In Option B you receive either $5 or $7 or $8. Your payoff is determined by drawing 
one ball from a bingo cage that contains 20 balls numbered 1, 2, 3, …, 20.  If a ball with 
number 1 to 3 is drawn then you receive $5. If a ball with number 4 to 7 is drawn then you 
receive $7. If a ball with numbers 8 to 20 is drawn then you receive $8. 
 
Ball nr 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Option A $3 $10 
Option B $5 $7 $8 
 
Making Choices  Please make your choices on all five decision pages by clicking on Option 
A or Option B 
 
Payoffs  After you make decisions on all five decision pages, all of your chosen options will 
be played as follows. 
A numbered ball will be drawn from a bingo cage that contains balls numbered 1,2,3,…,20. 
The ball drawn determines your payoff from the option you chose on the first page. The 
drawn ball is returned to the bingo cage. Next, a second ball is drawn, which determines your 
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payoff from the option you chose on the second page. That ball is returned to the bingo cage. 
This sequential procedure is continued until your payoffs are determined for all five decision 
pages. 
Your total payoff is the sum of your payoffs from all five decision pages, each of which is 
determined by an independently drawn ball.  
 
Subject Instructions (PAC/5) 
In this experiment, you are asked to choose between two options on each of five decision 
pages. On each decision page you will choose between a different pair of options. The 
example below shows two options that are similar to ones on decision pages.  
In Option A you receive either $3 or $10. Your payoff is determined by drawing one 
ball from a bingo cage containing 20 balls numbered 1, 2, 3, …, 20.  If a ball with number 1 to 
4  is drawn then you receive $3. If a ball with number 5 to 20 is drawn then you receive $10.  
In Option B you receive either $5 or $7 or $8. Your payoff is determined by drawing 
one ball from a bingo cage that contains 20 balls numbered 1, 2, 3, …, 20.  If a ball with 
number 1 to 3 is drawn then you receive $5. If a ball with number 4 to 7 is drawn then you 
receive $7. If a ball with numbers 8 to 20 is drawn then you receive $8.  
 
Ball nr 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Option A $3 $10 
Option B $5 $7 $8 
Making Choices  
Please make your choice on each of the five decision pages by clicking on Option A or Option 
B 
Payoffs 
After you make a decision on each of the five decision pages, all your chosen options will be 
played as follows. One numbered ball will be drawn from a bingo cage that contains balls 
numbered 1, 2, 3,…,20.  The ball drawn determines your payoff from the option you chose on 
all five decision pages.   
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Your total payoff is one fifth of the sum of your payoffs from all five decision pages; all 
payoffs are determined by the one ball drawn. 
 
